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paragraph 3:

in

Instruction

No. 1 wherein the court states in

"More specifically/ plaintiff alleges that defendant

was negligent in the following:
1)

In

failing

to

properly

Mikkelsen in the

advise

limitations

that

DaNiece
should be

placed on her physical activity, etc.
2)

In

advising

DaNiece

Mikkelsen in early 1979

that she could go skiing, etc.
3)

In improperly advising Mrs. Mikkelsen that she
could go

skiing without appropriate follow-up

examinations/ etc.

4)

In

failing

to

examinations

perform
on

a

physical
regular

and

x-ray

basis f

etc."

(R. 269)
In

its

answer

to

Question

No. 1/

Sefendant was negligent as alleged.

the

(R. 386)

jury

the

negligent

acts

alleged

by

that

What could be more

:lear than the fact that the jury found that defendant
Df

found

plaintiff

as

was guilty
set forth in

Instruction No. 1?
The response brief filed

on

Dr. Haslam states as follows:
jury's verdict is that
Least

one

Plaintiff's

of

her

Defendant advised

that

of defendant/respondent

"All that can be discerned from the

Plaintiff

claims

conclusion

behalf

by

was
a

the

Plaintiff that

successful

in

proving at

preponderance of the evidence.
jury

specifically

found that

she could ski is simply without
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the jury

had found in answer to Question No. 1 that defendant was

negligent as alleged, it was directed to Question No. 2.
Question No. 2 reads, "If
"yes", was

such negligence

plaintiff?"
cause

in

a cause

The jury's answer
Question

"individually
respondent

your answer

or

is

No. 2

confusing

of the

(R 386)

refer

the

language.
the

It

negligence

causation, and somehow drawing

No. 1 is

injuries received by

was "yes".

clearly

jointly"

to Question

The

jury

can

the insupportable

back to the

be

concept

words a

seen

with

that

that of

conclusion that

the words "either individually or jointly" apply to the negligence
issue rather than the causation issue. This is not the case.
Furthermore, all of the alleged

acts

of

negligence

on the

part of defendant, having been found to exist, and said negligence
as

alleged

accident,

having
it

been

follows

found

that

to

the

words

jointly" no longer have a meaning.
were a

cause of

be

a

cause

"either

of plaintiff's
individually or

All of said acts of negligence

plaintiff's accident

regard to the words "either individually

and defendant's point with
or jointly"

have fallen

victim to simple Aristotelian logic.
If

plaintiff's

requested

Instruction No. 4 had been given,

the jury would have been told that any one of the alleged
negligence set
in a

finding

acts of

forth in Instruction No 1, if proven, would result
of

negligence

on

the

part

of

defendant.

plaintiff's request was denied.
Requested Instruction No. 4 reads as follows:
You are instructed that in order to recover against the
defendant, the plaintiff is not required to prove every
4

But,

act of negligence alleged
complaint. I+ is
sufficient if she has proved by tat greater
jht of
the evidence any act of omission on the part of
defendant which constituted negligence and proximately
caused her injuries and damage. (I I
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not
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No. 4
^
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;e particularly, "laint
excepts 1J the failure to ^ive (We relieve we stated "an
instruction specifically stating:") a set instruction or
< Isewhere in the instructions, for the Court to fail to
instruct specifically that Plaintiff need not prove <:
and every act of negligence alleged in her Complaint ^
order tc prevail, but that if she proves , : «- or more
acts of negligence alleged
,o:e Complaint, ote sr* .< I proven'
*'* « Q ^
Accordingly
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DEFENDANT ADVISFD P F A THE ISSUES OF O
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THE CASE.
£ t page
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was ample evidence uo

. . JLNDJLNG THAT
. , ,L SAFELY SKI,
1ENC", ASSUMPTION OF
WERE ELIMINATED FROM

respondent's brief,
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--.;,e trial
5

i t: i s stated that "There
court's

submission of

contributory negligence and assumption of risk to the jury."
Appellant takes exception to this statement.
in

answer

to

Question

instructions of

No. 3,

the court,

and

again

that plaintiff

The jury found,

pursuant

this

the jury,

and that

in

of

light

question

should

the answer

Instruction

No. 1

of

risk,

are,

We

irrelevant.

That is,

as well as the jury's answer to
of contributory

as

take the

have been presented to

is totally

Question's No.l and 2, the issues
assumption

not

the

was herself negligent

and assumed the risk of injury, by skiing. (R. 386)
position that

to

a

matter

of

negligence and

law

removed

from

consideration in this case.
Let us assume a hypothetical state of facts that plaintiff is
a passenger in an automobile and that the driver has an impeccable
record as
accident

a safe

driver.

happens

interrogatory,

and

asks

she

the

contributorily negligent
be any question about
contributory

She

sues.

jury

to

The

the

by being

the fact

negligence

is asleep

use of

trial

question,

court,

in

an

plaintiff

in the automobile?"

Can there

that submission

the

back seat. An

"Was

jury

directions under such a situation would
submit that

in the

of the

issue of

without any guidelines or
be reversible

error?

We

the word "by skiing" as the only guideline in

allowing the jury to consider whether plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, where

there was no evidence whatsoever of carelessness

on the slope on her part, constitutes the same error
in the

hypothetical question

we have posed.

The issue shouldn't

have been submitted, and the answer of the jury to
6

as set forth

Question No. 3

shouldn't be considered.
The jury's

answer to

Question No. 3

places squarely before

the court the pivotal question of whether plaintiff can legally be
held

guilty

of

contributory

negligence and to have assumed the

risk of injury by skiing in light of the fact that she

was on the

slope as a result of her trusted physician's negligent advice that
she could ski.
The abundance of case
compels a
of risk

law

conclusion that

are not

cited

in

appellants

main brief

contributory negligence and assumption

defenses under

the facts

found by

the jury in

this case.
As we have pointed out, the only issue presented to the jury,
having to do with
negligence

and

defendant's
assumption

claimed

of

wherein the court allowed the

risk,
jury

and assumed

"by

the

contributorily

Allowing
negligent

simply not in accordance
malpractice cases.
of the accident.
for a

jury to

plaintiff's
plaintiff

and

find against
now

prevail

assumed

way

defendant

could

find
the

plaintiff was

of her own injury
that

risk

plaintiff was
"by skiing" is

legal principles

in medical

plaintiff was "skiing" at the time
legal criterion

in order

plaintiff, then what is to become of

she

trusted physician's medical advice?
only

to

supported
if

that

the risk

with sound

Of course

find

If this were the only

theory,
must

jury

of contributory

is found in Question No. 3

to

contributorily negligent
skiing".

defenses

ever
7

by

was

a

jury

"skiing"

finding,

that

as a result of a

We take the position that the
have

prevailed

on his claimed

defenses of contributory negligence

and assumption

of risk would

have been if he could establish an evidentiary basis in support of
a claim that plaintiff was
which she

skied.

And,

negligent

we point

because

of

the

manner in

out that no such claim was ever

made by the defense, except in general terms, either at
trial.

Obviously,

no such

claim was

evidence to support it, and the
if it

court would

witnesses to

have committed error

which reveals

gentle

slope, when

DaNiece fell to the slope.
skiing

We

that the only

the accident were Ken Herrick and DaNiece Mikkelsen.

They both testified that DaNiece was
a

there was no

had allowed the jury to speculate to such a conclusion.

again call attention to the evidence

on

made because

or before

backwards

or

skiing carefully

and slowly

a popping noise occurred, after which
Prior to her fall, Herrick
alongside

DaNiece,

was either
giving

her

instructions. (R. 613-614)
There was other convincing evidence on this matter.
Dr. Jack W. Crosland
hospital,

while

operation.

she

was

took
in

a

history

extreme

pain

from
and

DaNiece
prior

at the
to

her

He stated:

A.
"At that time she states that her hip started to
abduct, which means that the leg goes out to the side,
and as the abduction was taking place, she felt a
popping or painful snapping in the hip region and fell.
She
was
subsequently
taken
by
helicopter
to
St. Benedict's Hospital.
Q.
Did I understand from this that the history related
indicated that
the popping
or whatever happened,
preceded the fall instead of being a result of the fall?
A.

That's what she told me."

Further conclusive evidence as to what physically happened in
8

the

accident

Dr. Crosland

can

be

sets

found

forth

in

his

the

hospital

Description

of

records
the

where

Operation as

follows:
After removal of the prosthesis and removal of the
cement, from the proximal femur, it was noted that the
medial bone was in effect, just a very small shell that
could be cracked just by flicking it with a fingertip.
The x-ray

report requested

by Dr. Crosland,

also a part of

the hospital records, states:
There is lucency paralleling the shaft of the prosthetic
device which I believe represents loosening around the
shaft in most of its length, particularly in the middle
and distal thirds.
One stubborn

fact emerges.

The accident resulted, not from

the manner in which DaNiece skied, but from
hip.

Plaintiff's

hip gave

and supervised skiing
condition of

operation,

the long

which

she

popped,

suffered

prevented had it not
advice and treatment.

because

and

is

been for

of her

she was engaging in a careful
of

the

cortex in her femur bone.

events is that her hip
injury

way as

the condition

then

she

eggshell thin

The sequence of

fell.

The exact

the injury which could have been

her physician's

negligent medical

That is to say, DaNiece Mikkelsen would not

have even been on the ski slope had she not consulted and obtained
the approval of Dr. Haslam.
In support

of his contention that appellant assumed the risk

of injury, respondent states as follows:
blanketly assume

the risk

on the slope, he

or she

"While a

skier does not

of any possible injury that may happen
does assume

the obvious

risks inherent

in the sport, such as injury stemming from bad weather conditions,
9

heavy snow, or simply falling on
page

31.)

Arguably,

respondent's

considering the facts in
supportive of

to

hold

the case

at barf

DaNiece

However,

the statement

While a

risks inherent
that

(respondent's brief

statement is true.

respondent's position.

to assume the obvious
ludicrous

the hill."

in the

skier may be said

sport, it

Mikkelsen

is not

would be

assumed the risk of

being misinformed by her trusted physician.
That is, while DaNiece

may have

assumed the

risk of injury

caused by running into a rock or tree stumpf she certainly did not
assume the

risk

carefully skiing

of

having

down a

hip

pop

gentle slope.

inasmuch as DaNiece - in an
consulted her

her

effort to

as

obtain competent

went charging down the hill.

reasonable

a

precaution

as

trusted

physician

cannot

It is not

one

could
Being

considered

her hip, she
take

risk of

medical advice.
skiing, male

injury which

Further, because

a conscious

an

obvious risk

DaNiece did

ascertain whether or not her

undertake

skiing,

degree of

an ordinary,

in

like

in fact, prior to

effort to

to

would exercise

to have

resulted from acting upon poor

hip was strong enough
care which

in like

ill-advised by

inherent in the sport of skiing such that one may be held
assumed the

on her

Rather, not certain as to

skiing.
be

advice -

wind, strapped

limitations concerning

circumstances prior to undertaking
ones

socket while

physician prior to taking to the slopes.

the strength, stability, and
took

of

This is particularly true

as though DaNiece threw all caution to the
skis, and

out

exercised that

reasonable and prudent person

circumstances.
10

she

Therefore,

she

is not

contributorily negligent.
It may

also be noted that respondent's reliance upon Rigtrup

v. Strawberry Water Users Association.
is

somewhat

misplaced.

While

563 P.2d

the

1247 (Utah 1977)

law regarding assumption of

risk in Rigtrup is good law, the facts of the present case
support a

finding of assumption of risk.

order for a person to
danger, the

risk of

at page 1250.

assume

a

there

must

situation DaNiece

be said to have assumed a risk.

ski.

Pursuant to Rigtrup, in

relying

Mikkelsen cannot

upon

this

safe for

well-being.

of the risk of
could

not

Accordingly,

danger which

have

assumed

danger to

because she was not aware

actually caused

voluntarily

her to

advice, she engaged in an

activity which, as far as she knew, posed no inordinate
her physical

a "known

This is because she was not aware

She was advised that it would be

Justifiably

be

which is voluntarily assumed by a party." id

In the present

of any danger.

risk,

do not

her injury, DaNiece

said risk.

That is, it is

impossible for a person to voluntarily assume a risk which

she is

unaware of.
In appellant's main brief, we cite some thirty-two cases from
various jurisdictions supporting the proposition that if plaintiff
was

on

the

physician
negligence

slope

she
and

as

cannot

a

result

be

legally

assumption

of

of

the

held

risk.

advice of her trusted
guilty

of contributory

Respondent has ciced not a

single case which adequately rebuts appellants position.
Respondent

makes

v. Zimmerman, 232

an

attempt

to

distinguish

Halverson

NW 754 (N.D. 1930) and Schoonover v. Holden, 87
11

NW 737 (Iowa 1901) - both cited in appellant's chief
the

case

at

bar.

Respondent

Schoonover were concerned with
expand a

claims

brief - from

that while Halverson and

jury instructions

which sought to

patient's duties, no such instructions were requested in

the case at bar. While
distinguishable from

it

is

true

that

the

case

might lead

us to believe.

is because

of

decisions to

bar is

these two cases insofar as jury instructions

are concerned, the cases are not as distinguishable

the

at

as respondent

The reason appellant cited these cases

rationale

the

respective courts

jury instructions.

As set forth in

appellants chief brief at page 23f Halverson and

Schoonover stand

for

the

reject certain

underlying

propositions

that

"it

would indeed require an unusual

state of facts to render a person who
skill

guilty

of

contributory

is possessed

negligence because he accepts the

word of his physician and trusts in the efficacy of
prescribed

by

him.

A

patient

has

professional skill of his physician
Respondent also
407 A.2d

tries to

555 (D.C. 1979)

of no medical

the

right

the treatment
to rely on the

"

distinguish Morrison v. MacNamara,

from the

present case

Morrison dealt exclusively with the issue

of a

by stating that
patient's assump-

tion of the risk of a medical procedure, rather than assumption of
the risk of a dangerous
states that

sport

like

skiing.

Respondent further

hk has never raised the defense of assumption of risk

in reference to any aspect of his medical care.
page

38.)

This

is

not

entirely

respondents medical care (advice
12

true.

to patient)

(Respondent brief

Inasmuch

as it was

which put appellant

on the

ski slopef the defense of assumption of risk is related to

an aspect of respondents medical care - to wit, medical advice.
In

citing

N.M. 686,

275

appellants,

Los

Alamos

Medical

P.2d

175

(N.M. 1954),

respondent

. . . stands for

states

Center,
a

as

Inc. v. Coe,

case

also

follows:

cited

"Los

58
by

Alamos

the proposition that contributory negligence was

not shown to the extent that it would bar plaintiffs recovery as a
matter of

law.

In

Los Alamos, as here, contributory negligence

was a factual issue reserved

for

the

jury."

(respondent brief

pages 38-39)
It is

true that

jury the question of
gent as

a result

in Los

whether plaintiff

of following

jury found in plaintiff's
court,

in

Alamos the

sustaining

on

verdict,

whether, as a matter of law,

was contributorily negli-

the advise of his physician.

favor

the

trial court left to the

that
was

issue.

The

The appellate

not required to decide

contributory negligence

and assump-

tion of risk were no longer defenses if the facts established that
the patient acted in reliance on a trusted physician's advice. We
believe

that

a

careful

position that if the
have followed

reading

issue had

of

the

opinion

been before

supports our

the court,

it would

the majority rule and would have eliminated contri-

butory negligence and assumption

of

risk

from

to

respond

the

case,

as a

matter of law.
Appellant

feels

compelled

respondent, at page 39 of respondent's
"There is

to

a

brief, wherein

statement of
he states:

a distinction between following a doctor's order (as in
13

cases cited by Plaintiff) and simply seeking approval
cence in

an activity

to pursue."
the

or acquies-

Plaintiff had decided, for her own reasonsf

Where in the world can there be hidden in the body of

common

law

support

for

such

an

outlandish

contention?

Respondent cites no case law in support of this statement.
claiming

that

the

telephone

call

and

doctor was simply palaver or small talk?
the plethora

Is he

the advice given by the
We

refer once

again to

of cases cited in appellant's chief brief in support

of the proposition thatf as a matter of
held negligent

if she

acts in

lawf a

patient cannot be

reliance on a trusted physician's

medical advice.
POINT III
THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS NO. 1
AND NO. 2 MANDATE THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL ON THE
ISSUE OF DAMAGES- ONLY,
At page 41 of

respondent's brief,

and Company,

26 Utah

2d 448,

standing for

the proposition

Rowley v. Graven Brothers

491 P.2d
that a

1209 (1971)

jury verdict

is cited as

should not be

reversed unless there was an error or irregularity in the proceeding such that there is a reasonable likelihood to believe
its absence

there would

complaining party.
"error or

this error

This is precisely the situation at

is^ue of

was not

be

much

more

the proceeding

substantial

favorable
14

hand.

The

was the submission to

contributory negligence.

committed, there

likelihood, but rather a
would

have been a result more favorable to the

irregularity" in

the jury of the

that in

is not

Moreover, if

merely a reasonable

certainty

that

to DaNiece Mikkelsen.

the result
The error

committed resulted in

a

judgment

inconsistent

with substantial

justice,
A

brief

review

of

the common and statutory law concerning

this issue might be in order.
The early history of
the courts

the English

were reluctant,

common law

although not

discloses that

always, to

grant a new

trial on some issues, and support court or jury decisions on other
issues.

But, with

passage

of

apparent that

our system

not agonizing

continuance, of

time,

it

of jurisprudence
litigation.

became more and more
favored disposal, and
It was in this atmos-

phere that the concept that a litigant should be accorded only one
fair trial

on any

given issue

our system of jurisprudence.
59(a)

became

a

part

and

Procedure and was adopted
the year

began to find increasing favor in

Thus,
parcel

by the

after

years

of

study, Rule

of the Federal Rules of Civil
United States

Supreme Court in

1946. The rule provides that a new trial may be granted

"to all or any of the parties and on all

or part

of the issues",

either in actions tried by jury or actions tried without jury.
A Utah

committee of

lawyers and

judges, headed by attorney

Dean F. Brayton, President of the Utah State Bar, after long study
and

numerous

hearings, obtained

adoption

of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure by the Utah Supreme Court in the year

1949. Rule

59(a) of the Utah Rules reads in part as follows:
(a)
Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes;
We have cited many

cases in
15

our chief

brief wherein courts

have

invoked

business of
this state

Rule

59(a)

the court.
now has

and

limited issues in dispatching the

We submit

a long

that every

record of

District Court in

invoking Rule

59(a)f as a

useful and necessary tool in dispatching the business of the court
and dispensing justice to the litigants.
Respondent has

cited 58 Am. Jur. 2d., New Trials, Section 27

in support of his failing position that in

the event

a new trial

is granted, it should be granted as to all issues rather than just
to the issue of damages.

Let us consider the in-depth language in

58 Am. Jur. 2d., Section 24. The annotator states:
. . . an examination of the earlier English
decisions discloses that the English courts
generally, though not always, declined to
limit issues when awarding
a new trial,
proceeding upon the ground that a verdict of
the jury is indivisible and the judgment
rendered thereon an entirety which in all
cases must be dealt with as such.
Under this view, if a verdict was shown to be
erroneous with respect to any issue, the
practice was to direct a new trial as to all
of the matters in dispute. This is said to
have been the accepted rule of the common law,
and in some American jurisdictions, following
this common-law rule, the power of a trial
court to grant a new trial as to a part only
of the issues is denied.
No good reason
appears. however, why a verdict must be set
aside in toto when the issues determined by
the jury are in fact severable and when no
harm will result from retaining the verdict
and judgment upon those issues not affected.
All doubt of the power of English courts to
award partial new trials is cleared up by the
English Judicature Act which provides that a
new trial may be ordered on any question
without interfering with
the
finding or
decision upon any other question, and now
generally accepted view in this country is
that it is within the power of a trial court,
where there is more than one issue of fact in
16

a case and such issues are distinct and
separate in their nature, to order a new trial
of one issue and to refuse it as to others.
In many jurisdictions
this
procedure is
authorized by statutef rules of practice/ or
rules of court, but even in the absence of a
statute so providing when manifest justice
demands it, and it is clear that the course
can
be
pursued
without
confusion/
inconvenience^ or prejudice to the rights of
any partyy a new trial may/ according to the
majority view, be limited to a particular
severable question."
Andf again,

in Section

25/ the

annotator states in part as

follows:
• • • The guiding principle is that although a
verdict ought not to stand which is tainted
with illegality/ there ought to be but one
fair trial upon any issue / and that parties
ought not to be compelled to try anew a
question once
disposed of by a decision
against which no illegality can be shown.
Thus the parties and the state have been saved
the expense/ annoyance/ and delay of a retrial
of issues once settled by a trial as to
retrial of issues once settled by a trial as
to which no reversible error appears.
Here we have a case where the alleged acts of negligence/ one
of which was that the defendant physician advised his patient that
she could

skif was

found to

be fact

by the jury.

illegality claimed in connection with this finding.
and is

There was no
Defendant was

entitled to "but one fair trial" on this issue.

Plaintiff

ought not to be "compelled to try anew a question once disposed of
by a

decision against which no illegality can be shown."

the spirit of Rule 59(a) of the Federal
and Rule

59(a) of

Rules of

This is

Civil Procedure

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which follow

the Federal Rule.
Again, we

point

out

that
17

the

finding

of

the

jury that

Dr. Haslam's advice

put DaNiece

on the

slope, in the absence of

any evidence that she was negligent in connection
in

which

she

skied

with the manner

while on the slope, eliminates contributory

negligence, assumption of risk,

and

comparative

negligence from

the case; and leaves as the sole remaining issue the determination
of damages.

It was the condition of her

advice that

caused the

hip and

her physician's

accident, not the condition of the slopes

or her talent as a skier.
CONCLUSION
It is true that this case has lingered in the
years.

It

is also

true that justice has been long delayed.

we are at the point of
answers

in

response

special verdict.
with an

court for many

considering the
to

It is

questions

legal import

Now

of a jury's

propounded by the court in a

our position

that said

answers leave us

untainted finding of fact that defendant was negligent in

the particulars alleged by plaintiff as
Instruction

No. 1,

and

that

said

set forth

negligence

in the court's
was

a

cause of

plaintiff's injuries. The foregoing findings completely eliminate
contributory negligence

and assumption

of risk from the case and

leave as the sole remaining issue the question of damages.
The parties are entitled
issue."
negligence

The

parties

and

exhaustively and

ha/e

causation.

to

only

had

a

fair

The

evidence

expensively presented

the parties to this lawsuit.

"one

fair

on any

trial on the issues of
on

to the

this

issue

was

court and jury by

The decision is in.

18

trial

We respectfully submit that justice demands the granting of a
new trial on the issue of damages only.
DATED this a'fi^day of August, 1987.
BLACK & MOORE

Wayne Li Black
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

'jn.c^-fM X
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Susan B. Diana
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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